The core European economic policy debates of the last decade, and probably the next, surrounds the wisdom or otherwise fiscal consolidation and other austerity policies, pursued in response to higher public debt and credibility concerns sparked by the Global Financial and Eurozone crises. The IMF and the Politics of Austerity charts how the IMF fed into those debates, promoting one prominent set of diagnostic economic ideas about the crisis, and appropriate responses. In the process, the IMF re-evaluated its understanding of financial markets and their relationship to economic stability, and also re-assessed its understandings fiscal policy efficacy for advanced economies it deemed to have 'fiscal space'. In this contribution I address a range of issue raised in this symposium about austerity, the IMF, and the politics of economic ideas. For European politics scholars, the IMF warrants closer inspection than it often receives. This, as Lagarde put it, is 'not your grandmother's IMF'.
I am most grateful to the symposium participants for such searching, thought-provoking and positive critical engagements with my book. It always fascinates me how seeing the way other people see and read your own work makes one think about it afresh. This seems to be all the more true when one has been ploughing a particular furrow for many years.
Although first and foremost a book about the IMF, The IMF and the Politics of Austerity is also a statement of intent about how to go about doing ideationally oriented political economy work. As Hodson notes, the book makes the case that, sometimes at least, it makes sense to go beyond (or at least avoid) the broad-brush terminology of neo-liberalism when talking about evolving economic ideas. This term, despite or perhaps because of its imprecision, exerts a tremendously powerful gravitational pull over political economy scholars. One illustration of this that Ban urges my return to it in his critique! Neo-liberalism as a terminology and as a means to better understand the IMF, has limitations and can be somewhat analytically debilitating. Describing economic ideas as 'neo-liberal' hinders more that it helps because it does not exclude very much, and does not tell us enough about the content of ideas and their policy corollaries. Drilling down into how the politics of economic ideas plays out in more granular detail, as in my book, demonstrates the value of disaggregating beyond the label 'neo-liberal'. Only the can one reveal the more fine-grained contours of evolutions in economic theorising, as well as in IMF policy thinking and practice.
As one digs deeper, one finds a wide range of economic insights in play within this 'neoliberal' institution -including and heterodox elements. There are also complex processes of translation from the underlying doctrinal positions and assumptive foundations, at a high level of abstraction and generality, to their operationalization through particular methods and economic models, and more concrete policy-oriented concepts. None of these important 3 processes are likely to be the focus of attention if one has already resorted to the shorthand of neoliberalism. Conversely, in terms of research practice, side-stepping 'neo-liberalism' can open the door to mapping the contours of economic thinking more accurately, using as source material schools of thought in economics. This yields more analytical traction and explanatory purchase over how IMF thinking evolves (see also Chwieroth 2007 Chwieroth , 2010 . As
Hodson puts it in his contribution to this symposium, one payoff of these schools of economic thought is that 'they map onto the work of specific economists and the views expressed by IMF staff in an altogether more straightforward way than neo-liberalism ever could' (2018).
Casual allusions to 'dominant economic orthodoxy', like those to 'neoliberalism', tend to assume doctrinal singularity and homogeneity. The breadth a variety of ideas in play can be overlooked. In fact, almost diametrically opposing views of fiscal policy can be found within the mainstream of 'New Consensus' macroeconomics. This breadth, along a wide continuum, of fiscal policy approaches reconcilable to 'mainstream economic thinking' means there is no one single 'lesson from economics' for policy that policy elites can imbibe. Rather, there is a range of respectable academic economic opinion -a fact that can get overlooked when talking in broad-brush terms about neoliberalism.
The IMF and the Politics of Austerity charts how this breadth and scope within New Consensus Macro was used by IMF 'bricoleurs' in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to rehabilitate a positive view towards counter-cyclical fiscal policy as both a crisismanagement and a stabilisation tool. For those advanced economies who enjoy fiscal space, the Fund's repeatedly underscored central insight is how much more effective fiscal policy can be under recessionary conditions, where monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. This is particularly so in recessions that follow financial crisis.
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But as Ban's contribution to this symposium points out, only a minority of mainstream NCM economists saw the need for or merits of a rethink of models and assumptions on the scale the Indeed, within that continuum of 'mainstream' economic thought, the Fund occupies a somewhat liminal space on issues of macroeconomic stabilisation which tests its credentials as a font of scientific economic policy wisdom. That the Fund's position in the vanguard of a rethink has not been widely taken up within the economics profession perhaps pushes the limits of its intellectual authority which is so crucial for the institution to gain 'traction' in international economic policy debates. If the Fund does have fellow travellers on the road to revising the premises of its models to make them more relevant for post-GFC policy analysis, they are more likely found in central banks than academic economics. Central banks, given their operational remit, constitute a more fruitful hunting ground than some parts of academic economics for the corroboration and authoritative recognition which are so important to new Fund economic ideas gaining ground. Blanchard himself has recognised this difference and distance in modelling ambitions between academic and policy oriented research (2018: 48) .
Yet how far the Fund is prepared to follow the Bank of England down a path towards 5 accepting the limits of scientifically managing the economy? Could the IMF also embrace different 'rationalities of governance' (Thompson 2017) , auguring reduced reliance on and proximity to academic macroeconomics? This seems unlikely, but this is a research proposal waiting to be written.
Policy Paradigms -and Bricolage
In the background of most political economy studies dealing with economic ideas is a notion of ideational change understood in paradigmatic terms (Hall 1993) . The book was not written as a critique of the policy paradigm approach, but the more I learned about the Fund, the less helpful a standard paradigm framework proved for understanding its evolutions. The research findings do not indicate ideational change to be anything like so cut and dried as a paradigm shift, nor did paradigm maintenance adequately capture what was going on. Symposium contributors have found the mechanisms of ideational change I delineated useful.
Approaching the politics of economic ideas through this lens offers a route out of a paradigm change world-view. They point to the fact that there are kinds of ideational change in economic thinking other than paradigm shift that are important and interesting. For example, it is not the case that the post-GFC IMF advocates a different approach to fiscal policy for all countries at all times under all conditions. The Fund is not looking for a new fiscal policy template. What we are faced with instead is a granular but significant transformation of the centre of gravity of fiscal policy thinking, whose pace and degree can vary -notably according to nationally differentiated assessments of fiscal space.
Ban invites us to see the IMF's evolution as 'translation of the old neoliberal paradigm into a new, revisionist, neoliberal fiscal paradigm'. Leaving to one side the need to know much more about this 'translation' process, such a characterisation -where the pre-crash and postcrash Fund reside comfortably within the same paradigm -pushes beyond the limits of where 6 saying the two positions fall within the same paradigm tells us very much. At the fulcrum of the paradigm framework is a worldview. The IMF shifted from a pre-crash view which accepted, broadly speaking, Ricardian equivalence to a post-crash position where it rejects it.
Those are two incommensurable worldviews and fundamentally different understandings of the economy and policy. If this shift remains within a paradigm with the same label, then the concept risks being stretched in ways which limit its analytical purchase.
Contra a paradigm approach, a multiplicity of views are built into the Fund's knowledge bank, standard operating procedures, and policy frameworks, drawn from different paradigmatic homes. A repertoire of acceptable, respectable economic ideas are 'in play' within the Fund, and which come to the fore depends in part on economic conjuncture, and upon who is the recipient of the policy advice, amongst other factors. This tells against the standard paradigm change story fitting the facts in this instance. This broad church of economic thinking -its contours, its policy corollaries -is revealed by the above research 
